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Abstract 
Understanding disease transmission routes and implications for biosecurity is critical to mitigating 
livestock disease outbreaks and maintaining efficient and profitable production. The goal of biosecurity is 
to eliminate pathogen exposure and minimize endemic pathogen impact, particularly important for 
foreign animal diseases that threaten U.S. animal health and the economy. We elicit swine, beef cattle, 
and dairy expert views on the effectiveness, feasibility, and implementation of both biosecurity measures 
targeting disease transmission routes and specific biosecurity measures. Biosecurity targeting direct 
animal-to-animal contact, semen, people, and vehicles and other fomites was identified as the most 
effective and feasible for the swine, beef cattle, and dairy industries. Efforts targeting airborne and 
arthropod transmission were ranked low for effectiveness and feasibility across all three industries. The 
swine industry had higher estimated implementation of biosecurity against most disease transmission 
routes. All-in and all-out production had the highest estimated implementation in the swine industry. In the 
beef cattle industry, performing daily observations by producer/employees had the highest estimated 
implementation. Reduced environmental viral load through pathogen reduction had the lowest estimated 
implementation in the swine and beef cattle industries. In the dairy industry, monitoring production 
records for health status changes had the highest estimated implementation, and line of separation in 
place for all employees entering premises had the lowest. Swine experts considered separation line for all 
animals entering/leaving premises and reduced environmental viral load through pathogen reduction the 
most and least effective and feasible, respectively. Stabilization and monitoring for affected premises and 
daily observations by producer/employees were identified as most effective and feasible by beef cattle 
and dairy experts, respectively. All-in and all-out production was rated least effective and feasible by both 
beef cattle and dairy experts. 
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Abstract
Understanding disease transmission routes and implications for biosecurity is critical to mitigating livestock 
disease outbreaks and maintaining efficient and profitable production. The goal of biosecurity is to eliminate pathogen 
exposure and minimize endemic pathogen impact, particularly important for foreign animal diseases that threaten 
U.S. animal health and the economy. We elicit swine, beef cattle, and dairy expert views on the effectiveness, 
feasibility, and implementation of both biosecurity measures targeting disease transmission routes and specific 
biosecurity measures. Biosecurity targeting direct animal-to-animal contact, semen, people, and vehicles and other 
fomites was identified as the most effective and feasible for the swine, beef cattle, and dairy industries. Efforts 
targeting airborne and arthropod transmission were ranked low for effectiveness and feasibility across all three 
industries. The swine industry had higher estimated implementation of biosecurity against most disease transmission 
routes. All-in and all-out production had the highest estimated implementation in the swine industry. In the beef cattle 
industry, performing daily observations by producer/employees had the highest estimated implementation. Reduced 
environmental viral load through pathogen reduction had the lowest estimated implementation in the swine and 
beef cattle industries. In the dairy industry, monitoring production records for health status changes had the highest 
estimated implementation, and line of separation in place for all employees entering premises had the lowest. Swine 
experts considered separation line for all animals entering/leaving premises and reduced environmental viral load 
through pathogen reduction the most and least effective and feasible, respectively. Stabilization and monitoring for 
affected premises and daily observations by producer/employees were identified as most effective and feasible by 
beef cattle and dairy experts, respectively. All-in and all-out production was rated least effective and feasible by both 
beef cattle and dairy experts.
Keywords: Beef cattle; Biosecurity; Dairy; Expert survey; Foreign
animal disease; Swine
Introduction
State and federal animal health officials must be prepared to help 
deal with new, emerging, and foreign animal diseases characterized 
by uncertainty and complexity. Understanding disease transmission 
risks in light of current implementation of mitigating strategies can 
help identify opportunities for disease prevention and outbreak 
containment. In the event of a large, rapidly spreading foreign animal 
disease outbreak, biosecurity is the only tool realistically available as a 
means of control [1].
In this study we define biosecurity as “the implementation of 
measures that reduce the risk of disease agents being introduced and 
spread where biosecurity measures should be used to avoid the entry of 
pathogens into a herd or farm (external biosecurity) and to prevent the 
spread of disease to uninfected animals within a herd or to other farms, 
when the pathogen is already present (internal biosecurity).” [2].
Although biosecurity recommendations are often based on the risk 
of introduction of endemic diseases [3], there is always the risk of a 
new, emerging disease entering the United States that may circumvent 
current biosecurity recommendations [4,5]. An analysis of data from 
the National Animal Health Monitoring System (NAHMS) indicates 
32.1% of beef cow-calf operations disagreed or strongly disagreed with 
the statement, “The United States is well prepared to handle outbreaks 
of livestock disease currently not found in this country, such as foot-
and-mouth disease and rinderpest.” [6]. 
Understanding the drivers of behavior is crucial to developing 
effective strategies that result in behavior changes [7] and greater 
protection against new, emerging, or foreign diseases or pests. Social 
science approaches are being employed to better understand the 
mindset of producers and influential professionals about biosecurity [8-
11]. The literature includes a few assessments of expert views on factors 
influencing biosecurity decisions. Nissen and Krieter [12] compared 
risk factors in terms of importance for the introduction and spread of 
classical swine fever and foot-and-mouth disease in Germany. Kuster et 
al. [13] assessed the effectiveness and importance of individual on-farm 
biosecurity measures for preventing a host of infectious agents from 
entering and spreading on cattle and swine farms in Switzerland. 
Given the size, structure, and extensive movement inherent in the 
U.S. livestock industry, which presents unprecedented challenges in the 
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event of foreign animal disease outbreak [14], additional research is 
needed with respect to implementation of biosecurity measures. For 
example, no country with a livestock industry comparable to that of 
the United States has had to deal with an outbreak of foot-and-mouth 
disease [1]. 
As important as understanding the risk factors for the introduction 
and spread of disease is understanding the drivers of behavior to mitigate 
these risks [15]. Implementation of measures to protect animal health 
comes with a cost that must be weighed against potential effectiveness 
(and necessity). Feasibility and effectiveness are mentioned in most 
discussions of biosecurity at the producer level [16], thus we chose to 
focus on perceived effectiveness and feasibility in our study.
Stakeholders in the livestock industry are regarded as key players 
in the communication, selection, and implementation of biosecurity 
measures. Hernández-Jover et al. [17] found that successful livestock 
disease risk reduction depends on trust and co-management 
among stakeholders. We targeted livestock industry experts such 
as veterinarians, epidemiologists, animal scientists, and economists 
for an initial survey exploring the effectiveness, feasibility, and 
implementation of biosecurity measures in the swine, beef cattle, and 
dairy industries. 
Our focus was to evaluate biosecurity practices currently 
recommended against endemic diseases for their role in protecting 
against new, emerging, and foreign diseases. The specific objectives were 
two-fold: firstly, to identify expert views on the effectiveness (extent of 
risk reduction), feasibility (practicality of affordable implementation), 
and current implementation (adoption) of biosecurity measures 
applicable to specific disease transmission risks (termed routes in this 
paper); and secondly, to identify expert views on the effectiveness, 
feasibility, and implementation of a set of specific biosecurity measures. 
Materials and Methods
Questionnaire design and survey procedure
The survey procedures were approved by the Kansas State University 
Committee for Research Involving Human Subjects (#8132.1).
Three similar surveys were designed and circulated to swine, beef 
cattle, and dairy industry experts. Survey software, Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 
Provo, UT), was used to develop the surveys. Disease transmission 
routes and biosecurity measures were identified from the literature 
[2,18]. Nine disease transmission routes were examined: (1) direct 
animal-to-animal contact; (2) semen; (3) airborne transmission; (4) 
people; (5) vehicles and other fomites; (6) feed and drinking-water; (7) 
manure and bedding; (8) birds, bats, rodents, feral and wild livestock, 
and stray/domestic animals (hereafter referred to as wild carrying 
agents); and (9) arthropods. Nineteen biosecurity measures were 
examined (Tables 4, 5 and 6). All questionnaires included questions 
on all nine disease transmission routes. However, to minimize the risk 
of survey fatigue, questions on only five randomly selected biosecurity 
measures were presented to each respondent. To minimize the effect 
of order bias, items within each question were presented in random 
order. Demographic questions were also included to better identify the 
characteristics of the survey respondents. 
To encourage the respondents to think in the context of disease 
risks that pose the most significant threat to U.S. agriculture as they 
have the highest risks and consequences, we defined and deliberately 
asked them to keep Tier 1 disease risks in mind when answering 
questions. Tier 1 diseases include African swine fever, classical swine 
fever, foot-and-mouth disease, avian influenza, and virulent Newcastle 
disease [19]. 
The surveys were distributed by the National Institute for 
Animal Agriculture (NIAA) and the American Association of Swine 
Veterinarians (AASV). This sampling method relied on these two 
organizations to distribute the surveys to their members or subscribers 
using their preferred means of communication. Modes of recruitment 
were email list serves for NIAA members and online newsletters for 
AASV members. These communications included a link to the survey 
website and text describing the study. A reminder message was sent 
three weeks after the initial recruitment notice. One of the authors 
attended the 2016 National Institute for Animal Agriculture Annual 
Meeting during the study period to describe the study and encourage 
participation. 
In March and April of 2016, communication of the survey was 
circulated to 778 NIAA members (226 registered for the 2016 NIAA 
Annual Conference and 552 past members) and 1,965 AASV members 
(1,350 U.S. members, 285 international members, and 330 student 
members). These NIAA and AASV members were asked to complete 
the survey best aligned with the industry they were most familiar and 
engaged with—swine, beef cattle, or dairy. Respondents were also 
welcome to complete a survey for more than one industry.
Statistical analysis
Data from the survey software were exported and analyzed in Excel 
(Microsoft, Redmond, WA) and STATA [20]. As commonly used for 
the analysis of this type of data [21-23], cross-tabulations were used 
to compare responses by effectiveness, feasibility, and implementation. 
For example, of interest is whether biosecurity measures targeting a 
specific disease transmission route are both highly effective and highly 
feasible or highly ineffective and highly infeasible or some combination 
of the extreme ratings. Similar assessments were performed for specific 
biosecurity measures.
Results 
Response rate and respondent profile
Of the possible 2,743 experts contacted to complete the survey(s), 
190 completed questionnaires—55 experts from the swine industry, 70 
experts from the beef cattle industry, and 65 experts from the dairy 
industry (6.93% effective response rate). However, several surveys 
were only partially completed. For the analysis, 33, 38, and 37 surveys 
completed by swine experts, beef cattle experts, and dairy experts, 
respectively, were used. Descriptive statistics of the demographics (i.e., 
discipline, employment, and biosecurity expertise) of respondents are 
shown in Table 1.
Type of operation familiar to experts varied by species. Eighty-four 
percent of dairy experts most commonly interact with commercial 
operations and the rest of them with non-commercial operations. 
The beef cattle experts most commonly interact with cow-calf (79%), 
stocker (3%), feedlot (11%), and other operations (8%). Swine experts 
most commonly interact with farrow-finish (36%), farrow-wean (27%), 
feeder-finish (3%), wean-finish (9%), and other operations (24%).
Respondents interacted with operations in states with the largest 
number of operations and largest livestock populations. Approximately 
one-third of the swine experts most commonly interacted with 
operations in Iowa, and around one-sixth of experts most commonly 
interacted with operations in Illinois, with the remaining states 
including Ohio, Minnesota, Texas, Nebraska, Indiana, Oklahoma, 
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Kansas, North Carolina, and Georgia. These states represent 48% of 
U.S. swine operations and 84% of the U.S. hog inventory. The states 
that beef cattle experts most commonly interacted with were Kansas, 
Nebraska, Mississippi, Missouri, Texas, Iowa, Kentucky, Alabama, 
Illinois, Arkansas, Colorado, Michigan, Ohio, Georgia, Washington, 
California, Oregon, North Dakota, Tennessee, Wyoming, and 
Pennsylvania. These states represent 67% of U.S. beef cow operations, 
64% of the U.S. beef cow inventory, 61% of U.S. cattle on feed 
operations, and 83% of the U.S. cattle on feed inventory. Most of the 
dairy experts most commonly interacted with operations in Wisconsin, 
with a second tier including Texas, Washington, California, Ohio, New 
York, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and a third tier including Vermont, 
Florida, Michigan, Virginia, New Mexico, Maryland, Missouri, 
Indiana, Arizona, Idaho, and New Jersey. These states represent 77% 
of U.S. dairy cow operations and 84% of the U.S. dairy cow inventory [24].
Assessment of routes of disease transmission 
Rating of effectiveness, feasibility, and implementation of 
biosecurity measures targeting specific disease transmission routes are 
summarized in Table 2 for the swine, beef cattle, and dairy industries, 
respectively. 
Biosecurity targeting four disease transmission routes—direct 
animal-to-animal contact, semen, people, and vehicles and other 
fomites—was identified as the most effective and feasible for the 
swine, beef cattle, and dairy industries. Biosecurity targeting manure 
and bedding was not far behind for all three industries. However, the 
swine industry, but not the beef cattle or dairy industries, indicated 
effectiveness and feasibility of controlling wild carrying agents as 
Respondent Characteristics Swine Beef cattle Dairy
% % %
Level of knowledge regarding animal disease development, spread, 
mitigation, or risk
No expertise 0 0 0
Below average expertise 0 0 5
Average expertise 33 21 27
Above average expertise 33 42 38
Substantial expertise 33 37 30
Discipline or area of expertise and focus
Animal Science 6 5 3
Economics 0 0 5
Epidemiology 6 11 5
Veterinary medicine 85 79 73
Other 3 5 14
Current employer
University/academia 12 32 14
Government/public sector 18 37 38
Industry 64 21 22
Other 6 11 27
Contributions
Presentations (at a producer 
meeting) 
94 87 89
Non peer-reviewed publications 85 74 73
Peer-reviewed publications 55 50 43
Do you personally own or manage 
an operation
12 47 11
Number of observations 33 38 37
Table 1: Select survey respondent demographics.
Routes of disease transmission Highly effective 
highly feasible %
Highly effective 
highly infeasible %
Highly ineffective 
highly feasible %
Highly ineffective 
highly infeasible %
Implementation1
Mean Std. dev.
Swine Industry (N=33)
Direct animal-to-animal contact 64 3 0 0 3.09 0.84
Semen 58 0 3 0 3.36 0.90
Airborne transmission 9 3 0 12 1.67 0.69
People 55 0 0 0 3.00 0.75
Vehicles and other fomites 58 3 0 0 2.67 0.69
Feed and drinking-water 27 3 0 0 2.24 0.94
Manure and bedding 33 0 6 0 2.52 0.83
Wild carrying agents 33 0 3 3 2.52 0.87
Arthropods 9 0 3 15 1.91 0.81
Beef Cattle Industry (N=38)
Direct animal-to-animal contact 36 8 0 0 1.97 0.89
Semen 46 3 8 0 2.79 1.02
Airborne transmission 5 13 0 0 1.42 0.72
People 41 0 0 0 1.90 0.76
Vehicles and other fomites 46 3 0 0 1.74 0.83
Feed and drinking-water 15 0 5 3 1.87 0.88
Manure and bedding 33 3 3 3 1.82 0.77
Wild carrying agents 0 18 0 18 1.26 0.45
Arthropods 5 8 0 18 1.76 0.85
Dairy Industry (N=37)
Direct animal-to-animal contact 37 5 0 3 1.92 0.98
Semen 42 0 11 11 2.73 1.15
Airborne transmission 5 8 0 37 1.30 0.62
People 45 0 3 3 1.68 0.75
Vehicles and other fomites 39 3 0 0 1.73 0.84
Feed and drinking-water 29 0 0 5 1.81 0.85
Manure and bedding 34 0 0 11 1.89 0.84
Wild carrying agents 0 11 3 16 1.68 0.75
Arthropods 11 8 0 18 1.73 0.87
1The survey instrument collected information on current implementation using categorical variables 1=25% or less, 2=26-50%, 3=51-75%, 4=76% or more.
Table 2: Summary of effectiveness, feasibility, and implementation of biosecurity measures targeting disease transmission route in the swine, beef cattle, and dairy Industry.
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high as managing manure and bedding. Efforts targeting airborne 
and arthropod transmission were ranked low for effectiveness and 
feasibility across all three industries. 
In terms of estimated current implementation, biosecurity 
measures targeting semen were highest followed by those targeting 
direct animal-to-animal contact as a route of disease transmission 
across the swine, beef cattle, and dairy industries. The lowest level of 
estimated implementation was against wild carrying agents in the beef 
cattle industry and against airborne transmission in the swine and 
dairy industries. Estimated current implementation and differences 
between industries are displayed in Table 3. 
Assessment of biosecurity measures 
The estimated implementation of specific biosecurity measures 
are shown for the swine, beef cattle, and dairy industries (Tables 4, 5 
and 6 respectively) along with the percentage of experts ranking any 
measure at the extremes for effectiveness and feasibility. In the swine 
industry, the biosecurity measure of all-in and all-out production had 
the highest estimated current implementation; whereas protocols for 
pathogen reduction to reduce environmental viral load had the lowest 
estimated implementation. In the beef cattle industry, performing 
daily observations by producer/employees had the highest estimated 
Route of disease transmission Swine Beef Dairy Swine-Beef Swine-Dairy Beef-Dairy
(N = 33) (N = 38) (N = 37)
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value
Direct animal-to-animal contact 3.09 0.84 1.97 0.88 1.92 0.98 5.42 0.00 5.32 0.00 0.25 0.80
Semen 3.36 0.90 2.79 1.02 2.73 1.15 2.51 0.01 2.56 0.01 0.24 0.81
Airborne transmission 1.67 0.69 1.42 0.72 1.30 0.62 1.46 0.15 2.36 0.02 0.80 0.43
People 3.00 0.75 1.89 0.76 1.68 0.75 6.13 0.00 7.39 0.00 1.26 0.21
Vehicles and other fomites 2.67 0.69 1.74 0.83 1.73 0.84 5.09 0.00 5.06 0.00 0.04 0.97
Feed and drinking-water 2.24 0.94 1.87 0.88 1.81 0.84 1.74 0.09 2.03 0.05 0.29 0.77
Manure and bedding 2.52 0.83 1.82 0.77 1.89 0.84 3.68 0.00 3.10 0.00 -0.41 0.68
Wild carrying agents 2.52 0.87 1.26 0.45 1.68 0.75 7.77 0.00 4.34 0.00 -2.91 0.00
Arthropods 1.91 0.80 1.76 0.85 1.73 0.87 0.74 0.46 0.89 0.38 0.17 0.87
1The survey instrument collected information on current national implementation using categorical variables 1=25% or less, 2=26-50%, 3=51-75%, 4=76% or more.
Table 3: Differences of swine, beef cattle, and dairy industry experts’ assessment of implementation of biosecurity measures targeting disease transmission routes1.
Biosecurity measure Highly 
effective 
highly 
feasible 
Highly 
effective 
highly 
infeasible 
Highly 
ineffective 
highly 
feasible 
Highly 
ineffective 
highly 
infeasible 
Implementation1
Obs % % % % Mean Std. dev. 
A communication/education plan is in place to inform visitors and service providers of 
disease status and biosecurity requirements
8 63 0 13 0 3.13 0.83
Line of separation is in place for all visitors and service providers entering premises 7 57 0 0 0 2.86 0.38
Protocols have been developed and implemented to contain and/or exclude the targeted 
virus within the affected premises
7 43 0 0 0 2.43 0.79
A communication/education plan is in place to inform employees of disease status and 
biosecurity requirements
10 30 0 0 0 2.60 0.70
Line of separation is in place for all employees entering premises 8 50 0 0 0 2.88 0.64
Protocols for monitoring employee biosecurity compliance have been developed 13 38 0 0 0 2.46 0.88
Timely visits by veterinarian(s) 7 29 0 0 0 3.14 0.38
Daily observations by producer/employees 9 22 0 0 0 3.00 0.87
Monitoring of production records for health status changes 14 38 0 8 0 3.00 0.71
Protocols: have been developed and implemented pertaining to transport biosecurity to 
contain or exclude the targeted virus within the affected premises
8 38 0 0 0 2.25 0.89
Protocols have been developed for cleaning and/or disinfecting vehicles for certain 
animal movements (required for verification of biosecurity payments)
8 25 0 0 0 2.38 0.74
Line of separation is in place for all animals entering and leaving premises 5 80 0 0 0 3.00 1.00
Protocols for loading/unloading animals that attempt to minimize virus introduction have 
been developed and implemented
9 33 0 11 0 2.89 0.78
Protocols for pathogen reduction have been developed and implemented to reduce 
environmental viral load
6 33 0 0 17 2.00 0.89
Use of an effective disinfectant (required for verification of biosecurity payments) 12 58 0 0 0 2.67 0.65
Follow appropriate downtimes after cleaning and disinfection 11 55 0 0 0 2.64 0.81
Where possible, use all-in and all-out production practices 14 43 0 0 0 3.29 0.73
Protocols have been developed and implemented to establish stabilization and 
monitoring for the affected premises (monitoring may include submission of samples to 
a diagnostic laboratory for testing)
6 50 0 0 0 2.33 0.52
Movements of animals on and off the premises are routinely recorded 4 75 0 0 0 3.25 0.50
1The survey instrument collected information on current implementation using categorical variables 1=25% or less, 2=26-50%, 3=51-75%, 4=76% or more.
Table 4: Summary of effectiveness, feasibility, and implementation of biosecurity measures in the swine industry.
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current implementation. Similar to the swine industry, protocols for 
pathogen reduction to reduce environmental viral load had the lowest 
estimated implementation in the beef cattle industry. In the dairy 
industry, monitoring production records for health status changes 
and timely visits by veterinarian(s) had the highest estimated current 
implementation; whereas line of separation in place for all employees 
entering premises had the lowest estimated current implementation.
Swine experts considered the biosecurity measure of separation 
line for all animals entering and leaving premises as most effective and 
feasible (80% of experts identified as both highly effective and highly 
feasible) and protocols for pathogen reduction to reduce environmental 
viral load as the least effective and feasible (17% of experts identified 
as both highly ineffective and highly infeasible). Beef cattle experts 
identified protocols to establish stabilization and monitoring for the 
affected premises as most effective and feasible (88%); whereas the dairy 
cattle experts identified daily observations by producer/employees as 
most effective and feasible (71%). All-in and all-out production was 
rated the least effective and feasible by both beef cattle (14%) and dairy 
(8%) experts.
Discussion
Respondents 
The low response rate necessitates caution when interpreting 
results. It is unknown whether asking these experts to respond based on 
number of operations versus number of animals would have affected 
the results. Also, industry experts were asked for global assessments 
even if their assessment would have differed by specific production 
segment (i.e., farrowing versus finishing or cow-calf versus feedlot). 
However, the number of responses from experts with beef cattle, dairy, 
or swine experience were fairly even and geographically representative 
of the areas of highest concentrations of production. Future producer 
surveys, informed by these results, will provide a more complete 
picture of the implementation of biosecurity practices on these types 
of livestock farms. 
Biosecurity and disease transmission route
Across industries, the swine industry had higher estimated 
implementation of biosecurity against almost all disease transmission 
routes. This reflects the fact that the vast majority of commercially 
produced pigs do not have outside access, and therefore, are raised 
in more controlled environments than most cattle. Biosecurity 
against disease transmission by semen and direct animal-to-animal 
contact were consistently ranked highest in terms of implementation 
by experts from all three industries. Biosecurity against these 
routes of transmission was also considered effective and feasible. 
The implementation of biosecurity against two routes of disease 
transmission, airborne and arthropod-borne, was estimated to be less 
than 25% nationally by the swine industry and was not different from 
the implementation estimate for the beef industry (and beef was not 
different from dairy). In general, estimated current implementation of 
biosecurity measures targeting disease transmission routes was found 
to be more strongly correlated with feasibility than with effectiveness 
in the disease transmission routes across the three industries (data not 
Biosecurity measure Highly 
effective 
highly 
feasible 
Highly 
effective 
highly 
infeasible 
Highly 
ineffective 
highly 
feasible 
Highly 
ineffective 
highly 
infeasible 
Implementation1
Obs % % % % Mean Std. dev. 
A communication/education plan is in place to inform visitors and service providers of 
disease status and biosecurity requirements
9 33 0 0 0 1.78 0.67
Line of separation is in place for all visitors and service providers entering premises 10 80 0 0 0 1.50 0.85
Protocols have been developed and implemented to contain and/or exclude the 
targeted virus within the affected premises
10 55 0 0 10 1.70 0.67
A communication/education plan is in place to inform employees of disease status and 
biosecurity requirements
11 55 0 0 0 1.45 0.69
Line of separation is in place for all employees entering premises 8 63 13 0 0 1.38 0.52
Protocols for monitoring employee biosecurity compliance have been developed 8 0 0 0 0 1.75 0.46
Timely visits by veterinarian(s) 16 25 0 0 0 1.94 1.00
Daily observations by producer/employees 10 40 0 0 0 2.40 0.97
Monitoring of production records for health status changes 15 40 0 13 7 1.67 0.82
Protocols: have been developed and implemented pertaining to transport biosecurity to 
contain or exclude the targeted virus within the affected premises
8 38 0 0 0 1.63 1.06
Protocols have been developed for cleaning and/or disinfecting vehicles for certain 
animal movements (required for verification of biosecurity payments)
8 50 13 0 0 1.50 0.76
Line of separation is in place for all animals entering and leaving premises 10 50 10 0 0 1.30 0.67
Protocols for loading/unloading animals that attempt to minimize virus introduction 
have been developed and implemented
12 42 0 0 0 1.67 0.78
Protocols for pathogen reduction have been developed and implemented to reduce 
environmental viral load
8 50 0 0 0 1.13 0.35
Use of an effective disinfectant (required for verification of biosecurity payments) 6 67 17 0 0 1.67 0.82
Follow appropriate downtimes after cleaning and disinfection 13 46 0 0 0 1.69 0.63
Where possible, use all-in and all-out production practices 7 29 43 0 14 1.43 0.79
Protocols have been developed and implemented to establish stabilization and 
monitoring for the affected premises (monitoring may include submission of samples to 
a diagnostic laboratory for testing)
8 88 0 0 0 2.00 1.07
Movements of animals on and off the premises are routinely recorded 13 15 0 8 0 2.15 0.90
1The survey instrument collected information on current implementation using categorical variables 1=25% or less, 2=26-50%, 3=51-75%, 4=76% or more.
Table 5: Summary of effectiveness, feasibility, and implementation of biosecurity measures in the beef cattle industry.
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shown). This is not surprising as producer implementation decisions 
are likely to reflect privately absorbed costs and perhaps only partially 
internalize the broader, social values of more effective biosecurity 
measures. 
Biosecurity measures
Swine industry experts estimated that over 50% of the industry was 
implementing all-in all-out production (where possible), recording 
movements of animals, accessing veterinary services in a timely 
manner, communicating biosecurity requirements with visitors and 
service personnel, monitoring production records for changes in health 
status, observing animals daily, and maintaining a line of separation 
for animals entering and leaving the premises. Of these practices, 
maintaining a line of separation for animals entering and leaving, was 
ranked as being both highly effective and highly feasible by the greatest 
number of experts (80%). However, maintaining a line of separation 
for all visitors and service providers and for all employees was ranked 
as highly effective and highly feasible by fewer experts (57% and 50%, 
respectively) and is estimated to be implemented by fewer than 50% of 
the industry. Establishing a premises line of separation for people and 
animals is a key component of Secure Food Supply guidance to support 
continuity of operations in the event of a foreign animal disease 
outbreak (http://www.securepork.org/plan-components.php). As such 
it is an important biosecurity measure to mitigate a Tier 1 disease risk. 
Another key component of Secure Food Supply guidance is 
observation and reporting of animal health status. Accessing veterinary 
services in a timely manner, monitoring production records, and 
observing animals daily are all implemented widely by the industry, 
despite being ranked highly effective and highly feasible by fewer than 
50% of expert respondents. Managed movements of animals would be 
part of a foreign animal disease response. Recording of movements 
is important for tracing disease (forward or back) and has been 
implemented by more than 50% of the industry.
All-in all-out production is used by over 70% of nursery pig [25] 
and over 80% of feeder-to-finish farms [26] and has been shown since 
the early 1990s to improve health and performance [27], primarily by 
facilitating the control of respiratory diseases and reducing variability 
within lots of hogs marketed. Premises with all-in all-out production 
were able to implement protocols to eliminate porcine epidemic 
diarrhea virus from herds (personal communication). The integration 
of movement between premises specializing in different production 
phases requires pre-planning to address movement management in the 
event of a foreign animal disease outbreak.
Interestingly, the list of biosecurity measures, informed by the 
literature, from which experts were asked to evaluate a subset does not 
include any practices designed to minimize disease transmission risk 
by means of airborne or arthropod-borne spread. Efforts to minimize 
feed and water contamination do not appear on this list either. Manure 
management as a measure to prevent feed and water contamination 
and vector control in general do commonly appear in biosecurity 
recommendations in the United States [28].
Biosecurity measure Highly 
effective 
highly 
feasible 
Highly 
effective 
highly 
infeasible 
Highly 
ineffective 
highly 
feasible 
Highly 
ineffective 
highly 
infeasible 
Implementation1
Obs % % % % Mean Std. dev. 
A communication/education plan is in place to inform visitors and service providers of 
disease status and biosecurity requirements
9 11 0 22 0 1.89 0.93
Line of separation is in place for all visitors and service providers entering premises 11 27 9 9 0 1.18 0.40
Protocols have been developed and implemented to contain and/or exclude the 
targeted virus within the affected premises
8 13 0 0 0 1.25 0.46
A communication/education plan is in place to inform employees of disease status and 
biosecurity requirements
7 57 0 14 0 1.71 0.95
Line of separation is in place for all employees entering premises 9 11 0 0 0 1.11 0.33
Protocols for monitoring employee biosecurity compliance have been developed 6 50 0 0 0 1.33 0.52
Timely visits by veterinarian(s) 9 33 0 0 0 2.22 0.44
Daily observations by producer/employees 7 71 0 0 0 2.14 0.90
Monitoring of production records for health status changes 7 57 0 0 0 2.29 1.11
Protocols: have been developed and implemented pertaining to transport biosecurity to 
contain or exclude the targeted virus within the affected premises
7 43 0 0 0 1.57 0.79
Protocols have been developed for cleaning and/or disinfecting vehicles for certain 
animal movements (required for verification of biosecurity payments)
9 44 0 0 0 1.89 1.05
Line of separation is in place for all animals entering and leaving premises 8 50 0 13 0 1.38 0.74
Protocols for loading/unloading animals that attempt to minimize virus introduction have 
been developed and implemented
10 20 0 0 0 1.60 0.70
Protocols for pathogen reduction have been developed and implemented to reduce 
environmental viral load
21 38 5 0 0 1.62 0.80
Use of an effective disinfectant (required for verification of biosecurity payments) 11 18 0 0 0 1.36 0.50
Follow appropriate downtimes after cleaning and disinfection 14 43 0 0 0 2.07 1.00
Where possible, use all-in and all-out production practices 12 8 42 0 8 1.25 0.62
Protocols have been developed and implemented to establish stabilization and 
monitoring for the affected premises (monitoring may include submission of samples to 
a diagnostic laboratory for testing)
10 60 0 0 0 1.60 0.84
Movements of animals on and off the premises are routinely recorded 10 50 0 0 0 2.10 0.99
1The survey instrument collected information on current implementation using categorical variables 1=25% or less, 2=26-50%, 3=51-75%, 4=76% or more.
Table 6: Summary of effectiveness, feasibility, and implementation of biosecurity measures in the dairy industry.
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Conclusion
Experts report differences in effectiveness, feasibility, and current 
implementation of biosecurity measures targeting disease transmission 
routes and recommended biosecurity measures among swine, beef, 
and dairy industries. With this information, a targeted set of disease 
transmission routes and biosecurity measures can be examined 
that would allow for a more in-depth and refined study, enhancing 
the power of future studies, and improving the ability to formulate 
recommendations. All biosecurity measures come with a cost and 
ineffective and infeasible methods should be avoided. Likewise, 
transmission routes that impose the greatest risk should be the focus, 
rather than low-risk transmission routes. 
The information and infrastructure needed to achieve adequate 
biosecurity can vary significantly by industries. Variations in the 
management and marketing structure of each livestock industry, 
including size and reliance on extensive movement of animals, 
can complicate progress towards achieving sufficient biosecurity. 
Prioritization of the most effective and feasible biosecurity measures 
will ensure resources are applied where biosecurity advances are of the 
highest importance and that will offer the greatest return on investment. 
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